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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-The Right to a Jury Trial in Dis-
barment Proceedings
Lawyers in the United States have long been considered officers
of the court, subject to examination for good moral character and
adequate education in law before admission to the bar.1 They have
also been subject to summary proceedings for disbarment whenever
they have deviated from accepted standards of conduct2 embodied
in various codes of professional ethics.3 Although the specific grounds
for disbarment vary from state to state and between federal and
state courts, 4 one thing is clear: in the absence of a specific statutory
provision" there traditionally has been no right to a jury trial in dis-
barment proceedings. 6 Since the requirements of due process are cur-
rently undergoing re-examination, and since this particular question
has arisen in a number of recent cases, 7 this Note shall examine the
traditional policy in light of recent Supreme Court decisions.
Due process of law is essentially a dynamic concept, tailored to
the individual type of proceeding to which it is applied.8 It is not
only a limitation on the federal government through the fifth
amendment, but also on the various state governments through the
fourteenth amendment. The essence of the due process clause in
each of these amendments is that it protects the individual from
arbitrary action, both substantive and procedural, by the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches of government. 9 The other pro-
visions of the Bill of Rights give the individual in federal courts
further procedural safeguards in addition to the minimum require-
ments of the fifth amendment. Those procedural guarantees of the
Bill of Rights which the Supreme Court has deemed necessary to
attain a level of fundamental fairness have been selectively incor-
1. See Green, The Court's Power over Admission and Disbarment, 4 TEXAS L. RPv.
1 (1925).
2. See H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETICS 21-55 (1953); Potts, Disbarment Procedure, 24
TEXAS L. Rxv. 161 (1946).
3. For an excellent compilation of the state statutes concerning disbarment, see
Note, The Imposition of Disciplinary Measures for the Misconduct of Attorneys, 52
COLUM. L. REv. 1039 (1952).
4. For a discussion of federal disbarment procedure, see In re Isserman, 345 U.S. 286,
287 (1953).
5. A jury trial is provided in disbarment proceedings by statute in Georgia [GA.
CODE ANN. § 9-513 (1935)], North Carolina [N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 84-28(3)(d) (1965)],
and Texas [TEx. RFv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 316 (1959)].
6. Potts, Trial by Jury in Disbarment Proceedings, 11 TEXAS L. REv. 28, 38 (1932).
7. See, e.g., In re Griffith, 219 S.2d 357 (Ala. 1969).
8. Hannah v. Lerche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960); Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241 (1907).




porated into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
and are protected against abridgment by the states.10
To determine what constitutes due process of law in any given
case, one must first determine the essential nature of the proceeding
involved in light of the sanction which is its end." In examining the
question whether trial by jury should be extended to disbarment
proceedings, the approach required depends on whether such pro-
ceedings are characterized as criminal or as regulatory and hence,
noncriminal. If disbarment is criminal, those provisions of the Bill
of Rights which pertain to criminal proceedings must be observed
in federal courts, and those which have been incorporated into the
fourteenth amendment must be observed in state proceedings. In
noncriminal cases in which there may be a deprivation of life,
liberty, or property, the individual is entitled by the fifth and
fourteenth amendments only to notice of the proceedings against
him and to a hearing that is basically fair.'
2
However, the determination of the precise nature of disbarment
proceedings is not without difficulty. They have traditionally been
classified as civil proceedings,' 3 but courts are by no means unan-
imous in adopting this characterization. In fact, in a recent Supreme
Court decision, In re Ruffalo,' 4 the proceeding was characterized as
quasi-criminal for purposes of procedural due process.
The Court in Ruffalo held that a defendant in disbarment pro-
ceedings is entitled to fair notice of the charges against him,15 and
10. Those rights which have been incorporated are the rights of religion, speech,
press, assembly, and petition embodied in the first amendment [Malloy v. Hogan, 378
US. 1, 5 nA (1964); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927)]; the fourth amendment rights
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures [Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206 (1960)], and to have excluded from criminal trials any evidence illegally seized
[Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)]; the privilege against self-incrimination [Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965)]; the sixth
amendment rights to counsel [Gideon v. Wainwright, 872 U.S. 335 (1963); Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)], to a speedy and public trial [Klopfer v. North Carolina,
386 U.S. 213 (1967); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948)], to a jury trial in criminal cases
[Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)], to an impartial jury if one is required
[Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961)], to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
[Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967)], and to confrontation of witnesses [Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)]; and the eighth amendment right to be free from the im-
position of cruel and unusual punishment [Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)].
11. Due process in criminal cases differs from that in civil cases because some
guarantees of the Bill of Rights relate only to criminal cases and some only to civil
cases. See Ratner, The Function of the Due Process Clause, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1048,
1063 (1968).
12. See Shaughnessy v. United States, 45 U.S. 206, 228 (1953) (Justice Jackson, dis-
senting).
13. See, e.g., Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1882).
14. 390 U.S. 544 (1968).
15. The Ruffalo case involved the disbarment of an attorney in a federal court after
he had already been disbarred by a state court proceeding. The Court noted that the
eventual grounds relied upon for disbarment were not included in the original charges
against Ruffalo, but were added after he had given considerable testimony at his hear-
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that holding is undoubtedly sound. But it is Justice Douglas' rea-
soning in reaching this conclusion that is significant. Douglas viewed
disbarment as punishment and consequently classified disbarment
proceedings as "adversary proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature."'16
Manifestly, such a characterization is not essential to the holding
since fair notice is a threshold requirement of due process even in
civil cases. Nevertheless, the dictum may represent a tendency of at
least a segment of the Court to emphasize the criminal aspects of
disbarment. Such an emphasis departs from the traditional view of
disbarment,17 but it is not without support in reason and precedent.
In Ruffalo, Douglas cited Ex parte GarlandI8 for the proposition
that disbarment is punishment. The latter case arose during Recon-
struction when Congress passed a law requiring lawyers to take an
oath disclaiming disloyal activities before they could be admitted
to the federal bar. The Court in that case held that the statute was
a bill of attainder and an ex post facto law. Since the proscription
of bills of attainder and ex post facto provisions applies only to
criminal sanctions, 9 Justice Field, to reach this conclusion, had to
recognize the criminal aspect of disbarring a lawyer for reasons un-
connected with his fitness to practice. Recognition that disbarment
can be a criminal sanction,20 even though it does not involve a fine
or imprisonment, supports the conclusion that disbarment proceed-
ings are basically criminal.21
The view that disbarment is in fact a criminal sanction may be
supported by noting the similarity between disbarment and criminal
contempt. Like disbarment, criminal contempt is a disciplinary tool
of the bench which serves the combined object of preserving the
dignity of the courts and punishing those who affront the courts.
Since the same action can constitute both contempt and grounds
ing. The Court reasoned that the "absence of fair notice as to the reach of the
grievance procedure and the precise nature of the charges deprived petitioner of
procedural due process." 390 U.S. at 552.
16. 390 U.S. at 551.
17. See note 13 supra.
18. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867).
19. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 US. 580, 595 (1952).
20. But see, e.g., Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
21. Douglas also cited Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967), for the proposition that
disbarment is punishment. Spevack held that a lawyer may invoke the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination in disbarment proceedings without being
disbarred for so doing. Although that privilege by its terms applies only to criminal
cases, it has been extended to civil cases, the evidence from which may be used in a
later criminal proceeding. Spevack, however, seems to proceed from the assumption
that disbarment as a sanction is too serious to impose on a lawyer for invoking the
privilege. Hence, it is not clear whether the Court views disbarment as a quasi-
criminal sanction and disbarment proceedings as criminal in nature, or whether it is
merely delving into a "liberal construction" of the privilege against self-incrimination
beyond its terms. 385 U.S. at 516.
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for disbarment, it might be argued that they are really alternative
sanctions of the same basic nature, that is, criminal.22 It may also
be observed that disbarment fulfills the retribution and deterrence2 3
goals of the criminal law, although its rehabilitative effectiveness is
as suspect as that of a prison term. Also worth noting in this regard
is the fact that even some of those courts which view disbarment as
essentially civil have characterized it as criminal to control the quan-
tum of evidence needed for disbarment24 or to construe the disbar-
ment statutes.2
5
The ramifications of emphasizing the criminal aspects of disbar-
ment proceedings are apparent. Once a proceeding is denominated
criminal, it is not only governed by the threshold considerations of
due process, but also by the other procedural safeguards of the Bill
of Rights which relate to criminal proceedings. Among those safe-
guards is the right to trial by jury. However, whether that right
applies to disbarment proceedings is dependent not only upon
whether the Supreme Court chooses to define disbarment proceed-
ings as criminal or quasi-criminal, but also upon the application of
certain other traditional tests.
Although the language of the sixth amendment is inclusive, ex-
tending to "all criminal prosecutions," it has never been applied
literally.2 Since the adoption of the Constitution, the language has
always been read with reference to colonial and common-law ex-
perience.27 Those cases which required a jury trial, and those which
did not, came to be loosely defined as "serious" and "petty" offenses
respectively.28 The basic test for determining whether a case is
"serious" so as to require a jury trial was developed in District of
Columbia v. Clawans.2- Three factors are considered under the
Clawans test; and if any one is found to exist, trial by jury is re-
quired. First, the moral nature of the offense in light of con-
temporary societal norms is examined to determine whether the
community views the act as serious. Second, if a jury trial was
required at common law, it is also required under the sixth amend-
ment. Finally, even if the offense is found not to warrant a jury trial
22. The Supreme Court of the United States has stated that criminal contempt is
a crime in every essential respect. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968). The Court
held that, due to the severity of the penalty imposed in that case (twenty-four months
imprisonment), a jury trial was constitutionally required. 391 U.S. at 211.
23. See Lantz v. State Bar of California, 212 Cal. 213, 220 (1931).
24. In re Thatcher, 190 F. 969, 976 (N.D. Ohio 1911).
25. In re Donegan, 282 N.Y. 285, 26 N.E.2d 260 (1940).
26. See Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional
Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HAsv. L. REv. 917 (1926).
27. Id. at 921-22.
28. Id. at 969.
29. 300 US. 617 (1937).
Notes
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under th. first two tests, trial by jury may be required if the penalty
is severe.
In recent years, however, several cases appear to indicate that
the Court is emphasizing the third phase of the Clawans test to the
exclusion of the other two phases.80 This tendency has been especially
marked in criminal contempt cases. But although those cases seem
to focus on the allowable or actually imposed penalty as a mechanical
line between serious and petty offenses, the Court has continued
at least to acknowledge the validity of the other phases of the
Clawans test.31 The Court's approach has been to treat criminal
contempt as a monolithic genre of offenses classified as petty under
the community standards phase of the Clawans test.32 Thus the de-
termination of whether a jury trial is required depends upon the
severity of the penalty. Since there are no statutory penalties for
contempt, this crucial determination cannot be made until a penalty
is actually prescribed by the judge. A more fruitful approach would
be to recognize that the range of conduct which may constitute
criminal contempt extends from that which is morally innocuous
to that which shocks the moral sense.33 Then the Court could make
a prospective determination by applying the community standards
phase of the Clawans test to the particular conduct which constitutes
the contempt. 34
In attempting to apply the community standards test to disbar-
ment cases, a problem arises which is similar to that of the criminal
contempt cases: a variety of different types of conduct can constitute
grounds for disbarment.35 While it is not fruitful to generalize about
the scope of the various state provisions for disciplining attorneys,
it is possible to discern the general philosophy behind the statutes
and court rules governing the conduct of lawyers. As one commen-
tator has stated, "attorneys are rightfully expected to maintain a
standard of ethics and moral integrity somewhat higher than that
demanded of other groups in the society. It is a concomitant of
their status as officers of the court and the fact that to them are
entrusted people's lives and fortunes."36 Thus, lawyers are disci-
plined for breaching the high level of trust commensurate with their
80. See Frank v. United States, 395 US. 147 (1969); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 884 U.S.
873 (1966).
31. See Frank v. United States, 895 U.S. 147 (1969); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 884 US.
373 (1966).
32. Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 884 U.S. 878, 880 (1966).
38. Conduct constituting contempt runs the gamut from filing a baseless complaint
[Toft v. Ketchum, 18 N.J. 280, 113 A.2d 671 (1955)] to assaulting a judge [Turquette
v. State, 174 Ark. 875, 298 S.W. 15 (1927)].
84. Cf. District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 US. 63 (1930).
35. See Note, supra note 8.
86. Note, supra note 8, at 1048.
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position. Yet it is only the most serious cases of departure from
statutory norms which will result in disbarment. Normally a lawyer
will be disbarred only for aggravated or oft-repeated misconduct
which shows an incapacity to live up to his position of trust.37 For
lesser offenses merely a reprimand or suspension is the usual pen-
alty. Furthermore, it is significant that those purely criminal acts
which warrant disbarment are generally the type of crimes for which
a jury trial is required. Most state statutes imposing disbarment for
the commission of a crime not related to an attorney's professional
status differentiate between felonies and misdemeanors such that a
lawyer will be disbarred only for commission of a felony or a mis-
demeanor involving moral turpitude. Petty offenses which do not
require a jury trial are not normally grounds for disbarment.38
Thus, since it is clear that disbarment is imposed only for ex-
tremely serious misconduct, 9 acts constituting disbarment seem to
satisfy the first phase of the Clawans test as acts of a serious moral
nature requiring a jury trial under the sixth amendment. It does
not appear that disbarment proceedings fall within the other
two phases of the test as the Court now applies them. Clearly, dis-
barment did not require a jury trial at common law.40 Also, since
disbarment does not involve a term of imprisonment as the sanction,
the approach of the Court in recent cases, which classifies crimes as
serious solely on the basis of the term of imprisonment allowable or
actually imposed,41 would not include disbarment as a serious penalty
warranting a jury trial.
Under the foregoing analysis, the conclusion that the attorney-
defendant should be assured the right to a jury trial in disbarment
proceedings depends upon a characterization of the proceedings as
basically criminal in nature. This view, while supportable, has some
obvious shortcomings. Disbarment proceedings may also be de-
scribed as having a regulatory rather than a punitive goal. Yet to
determine on that basis alone that a jury trial is not required in
disbarment proceedings would be to ignore the threshold require-
ments of due process which must be met in any case in which an
individual may be deprived of life, liberty, or property.
Punishment' can take several distinct forms-primarily those of
compensation, regulation, criminal sanction, or treatment.42 Disbar-
ment as a punishment can be classified according to these forms.
Clearly it is not a compensatory sanction like the normal civil suit
37. H. DRINKER, supra note 2, at 47.
38. See Note, supra note 3, at 1049.
39. See In re Cahill, 66 N.J. Law 527 (1901).
40. Ex parte Thompson, 228 Ala. 113, 152 S. 229 (1933); Potts, supra note 6, at 36.
41. See Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147 (1969); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384
U.S. 373 (1966).
42. H. PAcm , THE Limrrs oF THE CRmsINAL SANCTION chs. 1-2, at 9-34 (1968).
Notes
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for damages, nor is it treatment like civil commitment. Disbarment
as punishment, then, must be criminal or regulatory. Manifestly,
like most forms of punishment, it has elements of both types of
sanction. But by focusing on the purpose of the sanction, rather
than on its effect, disbarment may be seen as essentially regulatory.43
Like the revocation of any other license, disbarment serves to main-
tain professional standards. Of course, unlike the revocation of other
professional licenses, which is a function of the police power of
the legislature, disbarment is intrinsically a judicial function be-
cause lawyers are officers of the courts. While this distinction may
be important in other senses, 44 it does not appear to affect the basic
regulatory nature of disbarment proceedings. Nor does the severity
of the sanction change the essential purpose of the proceeding. In
determining the nature of a proceeding, it is the nature of the sanc-
tion, not its severity, which controls.45
If disbarment proceedings are viewed as primarily for the pur-
pose of regulating the standards of the legal profession for the pro-
tection of the public, the procedural due process requirements for
disbarment cannot be determined by reference to criminal proce-
dure. Rather, threshold considerations of procedural due process
must govern the analysis: the lawyer must have fair notice of the
proceedings against him, he must be given a hearing and oppor-
tunity for explanation and defense, and the proceeding must be
basically fair and just to the accused.46 Apart from these require-
ments, any specific formal procedures may be adapted to the partic-
ular needs of the case.47
It is difficult to generalize about disbarment procedure since it
varies from state to state.48 It is universally recognized that disbar-
ment can be effected by judicial action only.49 This means that a
court with jurisdiction must enter the order of disbarment.50 But
many states have procedures whereby grievance committees for local
bar associations make preliminary findings and submit them to the
court which then rules on the evidence so obtained.51 In other states
the disbarment is handled in a regular court proceeding.12 What-
ever the precise procedure in any given state may be, the basic
43. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 182 (1963).
44. See text accompanying note 58 infra.
45. See, e.g., H. PA KER, supra note 42, at 251-56.
46. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
47. See, e.g., In re Griffith, 219 S.2d 357 (Ala. 1969).
48. See Potts, supra note 2, at 179.
49. See, e.g., People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Assn. v. People's Stock Yards State
Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N.E. 901 (1931). See also Potts, supra note 6, at 44.
50. See H. DasNKE, supra note 2, at 11-51; Potts, supra note 2.




outline of the disbarment proceeding-from the initial commis-
sion of the alleged offense to the actual striking from the roles-
is the same. An attorney commits an offense against the legal-
judicial system directly, or he commits an offense not related to his
practice of law, but which if proved would tend to cast disgrace upon
the profession and the courts. Charges of the offense are then brought
to the court or to the local bar association. Notice of the charges is for-
warded to the accused. He is then afforded a hearing either in court
or before a bar association grievance committee which submits
findings to the court. A court then rules on the evidence and, if it
is necessary, orders the disbarment. Appeal is universally allowed to
the highest court of the state.
One thing is at once apparent about the pattern of the dis-
barment procedure from beginning to end: the adjudication of
the case is always in the hands of parties who may be interested.
It is not unreasonable to presume that judges and lawyers are
interested parties in disbarment proceedings, for they have an in-
terest in preserving the good reputation of the legal system. This
interest may cause them to be unduly harsh toward attorneys ac-
cused of misconduct. On the other hand, in some cases, attorneys may
be unduly lenient to their delinquent brethren. Clearly, political
factors may exert an influence on bench and bar in disciplining its
own members. Probably the most forceful current danger of bias lies
in having lawyers or judges of one philosophical view have an un-
restrained hand in disciplining lawyers of another view. The pos-
sibilities for abuse are obvious and have long been recognized by the
courts.53 It is questionable whether "discretion" is a sufficient safe-
guard to balance against the manifest possibilities for abuse.
At no time in the disbarment procedure are the facts ascertained
by a clearly impartial tribunal. Rather, lawyers and judges control
the entire fact-finding, adjudicatory, and reviewing process. In a
practical sense, this system allows the injured parties-namely, the
bench and bar-to sit in judgment of an accused attorney at all
stages of the proceeding. This fact raises doubts as to the fundamen-
tal fairness of the procedure, since impartiality of the adjudi-
cating tribunal is an essential element of fairness to the accused 4
53. It has long been recognized that both contempt proceedings and disbarment
proceedings by their summary character can be convenient vehicles for the bar and
bench to deal with lawyers who champion unpopular causes. Frequently judges warn
that the most careful discretion must be used because this summary power of punish-
ment is so great. See Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 148 (1961) (Justice Black, dis-
senting); Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1952) (Justice Black, dissenting);
Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 317 (1882) (Justice Field, dissenting). See also Wall St. J.,
April 28, 1969, at 1, col. 1.
54. The Supreme Court has recognized that there are some elements to an essen-
tially "fair trial" which are not enumerated in the Bill of Rights. See Ratner, supra
note 11, at 1064.
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Although in most cases involving revocation of licenses mere resort
to the courts will afford a fair procedure, disbarment proceedings
require another finder of fact, the jury, in order to guarantee the
accused an impartial hearing. 5
The suggestion of injecting the institution of the jury into dis-
barment proceedings to insure the accused some modicum of funda-
mental fairness is no doubt a novel one. Disbarment proceedings
have traditionally been summary in nature.56 But an unfair practice
should not be sanctified by custom and usage.57
An obvious objection to the proposal of extending a jury trial
to disbarment cases arises from the recognition that the revocation
of other professional licenses is normally handled by administrative
boards composed of members of the accused's profession. These
board members may also be presumed to be interested parties. But
there is universally in these cases the right of review in the courts,
and it appears that this right is probably of constitutional dimen-
sions.58 When a doctor or an accountant appeals the loss of his li-
cense to the courts, he invokes an impartial tribunal to determine
his rights. On the other hand, when a lawyer appeals his disbarment,
the appellate tribunal can still not be presumed to be completely
impartial. Consequently, in disbarment cases a jury trial should be
required in order to assure some objectivity in the proceedings. 50
This distinction between disbarment and the revocation of other
professional licenses is consistent with the theory that due process
requirements may be adapted to the nature of the particular pro-
ceeding involved. That distinction would also seem to permit the use
of the jury as fact finder in disbarment cases and not in other license
cases without violating the requirements of the equal protection
clause. Thus it is possible to avoid the practical problem of extend-
ing the requirement of trial by jury to all administrative proceed-
ings involving revocation of licenses.
The right to jury trial could be extended to disbarment pro-
ceedings by either of two approaches. Disbarment might be treated
as essentially criminal in nature and therefore covered by the sixth
amendment. Such a characterization is supportable, but it might be
argued that to treat disbarment as criminal mistakes the basic nature
of the proceedings, which is regulatory rather than criminal. How-
55. But see McVicar v. State Bd. of Law Examiners, 6 F.2d 33 (W.D. Wash. 1925).
56. See H. DaiKER, supra note 2, at 11-51; Potts, supra note 2.
57. See note 22 supra.
58. See Jaffe, The Right to judicial Review (pt. I), 71 HARV. L. REV. 401 (1958);
Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review (pt. I1), 71 HARv. L. REv. 769, 795 (1958).
59. See, e.g., St. Joseph Stock Yards v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 73 (1936) (justice
Brandeis, concurring).
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ever, in the event that disbarment were treated as regulatory, the
right to jury trial might still be extended by a fundamental-fairness
approach. Whether either approach is accepted in reconsidering the
traditional absence of jury trials in disbarment proceedings, it is at
least clear that some reconsideration of the problems of ensuring
justice for an attorney accused of misconduct is in order.
